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JOHN GLUCKER
ectv n.ev ovv fiq einov EKotTepov "kaxw tv^Tiq aioSrioli; te xal vovc,,
dvdyKTi xov Kexpimevov d|i,(poTEpoi(; ejie euepYExeioGai- edv 5e Jioppco
Tov Xoyov djio VOX) Kai aioSrioecoq dnayayajv nxxzipa ^ev xov
yevvTioavTa <t6v> k6o|j.ov, [ir\iipa 5e xriv oocpiav, 5v' fiq amicXtaQx] xb
Tidv, Ti|ifi(; d^icocrriq, auxoc; t\> miar] 5eixai ydp o-uSevoq" ouxe 6 7iX,TipT|<;
GeoQ oiSxe ti axpa Kai navxeXtiq enicxrmri, oSoxe xov Gepajie'oxvKov''
xovjxcov )if| xoix; Gepanc'uoiievo'uq dvev5e£i<; ovxai; dX^' ea-uxov ^dXioxa
axpeXeiv.'^ injciicn ^ev ydp koI 0K-uXaKe\)xiKTi, enioxtmri Gepaneiaq fi fiev
iTtTtcov Ti 5e oK\)X.dKcov o^oa,** nopi^ei xoic; ^cooiq xd axpeXv^a,* cbv
EKeiva SEixav*^ |ifi nopi^o-ooa 5£ djieX^iv dv 5oKo{r|. xfiv 5e etjoePeiuv
0Eot) 0Epan£iav vnapxovaav^ ov Bejik; nopioxiKTiv EinEiv xcov
cb(p£A.Tio6vx(ov x6 Geiov" (i)(p£>.£ixai ydp vn o\)5£v6(;,' dxE ^tjxe evSee^
ovJ iiTjXE xivoq x6 £v dnaoiv a\)xot» KpEixxov nz(px>K6xoc, ovfjoai,
xo-ovavxiov bk xd oiijinavxa ovvExcbq Kai anavoxatc, cocpeX.ev.'' oSoxe
oxav xfiv E\)a£Peiav Xeyco^iev eIvqi Geov 0Epa7t£iav,8 {)7tTip£ciav xivd'
xoiaiJXTiv (pa|i£v, onoiav 5o\)Xx)i 5£a7i6xai(; x6 keXe-oojievov doKvcoq
noiEiv EyvcoKOXEi; unripExovai.'" SioiOEi 5e TcdXiv, oxi ol |j.ev btanoxai
-OTtTipEoiac; evSeeic;, 6 be Qcbq ov xp£^o<;'" woxe ekeIvok; ^ev xd
oxpE^Tiaovxa a\)xo\)(; {)nrip£xo\)ai., xqj 5' ovSev e^co (piA.o5Eon6xo\)
yva))a.Tiq napE^o-oai- PeXxicoooi |I£v ydp ovSev Evprjaouai," xcov
6£(jnoxiKcc)v ndvxcov e^ dpxfjq ovxcov dplaxcov, jiEydXa 5' aiixo'ix;
6vr|oo-oav yvcopioOfivai Geco 7rpO)j.Ti0ov))j.£voi. (Philo, Quod Deterius 54—
56)
a. 14el-2: (bv ekeivoi x-uyxdvovaiv 5e6|xevoi nap' fmcbv. 14e2-4: ov
ydp xEXviKov y' av Eirj ScopocpopEiv 5i56vxa x(p xauxa (bv o-uSev
8Eixai.
b. 12e5: x6 nEpi xf|v xtbv Gecov GEpanEiav kxe.
c. 13b8-9: eti' dyaGm xivi eoxv koi cbcpEA-ia xov G£pa7CE\>o|i£vo-u.
d. 13a4-5: 'innovc, ov nac, Enioxaxai GEpanE-oEiv, dX^ 6 InniKOi;.
13a8: ti ydp iTiTiiicn initcov GEpajtEia. 13a9-10: ovbi yt Kwaq nac,
ETcioxaxai GEpa7i£\)Eiv dXXd 6 KvvrjyExiKoc;. 13al2: r\ ydp nov
KDvriyExiKTi icovcbv GEpaTtEia.
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e. 13b8: en' . . . (ixpeXia. 13bl0: a)<p£Xo^)vxal. 13c4: tn' axpeXia.
13c6: Geiov cocpeA-ia. 15a2: a 5e nap' r\\i(ov Xa|ipdvo\)civ, xi
axpeXouvxai; 15a5-6: aXX' oiei . . . xouq Geovc; oxpeXeioOav ano
xovxcov, a Tcap' njiMV Xa^pdvo-uoiv;
f. 14d9-10: (bv Seo^eGa nap' eKeivcov. (See also a.)
g. 12e5—7: xovxo . . . x6 fiepoq xou Sixaiou eivai eiiot^ic, xe Kal ooiov,
x6 Jiepi xf|v xcov Gecbv Gepaneiav.
h. See c, e.
i. See a, c, e.
j. See a.
k. 15al-2: ovbtv ydp ti|iiv eoxiv dyaGov oxi dv jifj ekeivoi 6a)aiv. d
5e Tiap' -fmcov X£X|iPdvo\)aiv, xl oxpEXovvxai;
1. 13d7: -urtTipexiKTi xiq dv, (oc, eoikev, e'l'ri Geoic; (and context),
m. 13d5-6: rivjiep . . . ol 5oii)Xov xovq Sconozac, Gepanevouaiv.
n. See a, c, f.
0. 13blO: (ixpeXouvxai koI PeXxio-uq Yiyvovxai. 13c7: koi PeX.xio'uq
xoi)(; Geo\)(; Jioiei. 13c8-9: PeXxico xvvd xcov Gecbv djiepYdi^ri;
I have followed the Philonian text with parts of the relevant pages of Plato's
Euthyphro, where verbal similarities are close enough. To the best of my
knowledge, Professor John Dillon is the only one so far who has noted the
similarities. His context is that of "the canon of two virtues," and he only
notes briefly: "That Philo had the Euthyphro well in mind is shown by the
echoes oiEuth. 13A ff. in Del. 55-6."'
This, however, is only the beginning of our story. When Philo is
echoing a source—even Plato—what matters is what he does, in each case,
with his Platonic materials. Even on a cursory reading, it should be clear
that these pages of Plato have passed through a serious transformation,
Euthyphro is an aporetic dialogue, where questions and refutations are the
order of the day, and where answers, in the few cases where they are given,
are not answers to the central questions, but usually part of the refutation.
Philo provides us, within the space of one page or less, with more answers
(and no questions whatsoever) than the whole of Plato's dialogue. This, as
well as Philo's own context and theological framework, would account for
the many differences between his passage and its "source." Let us point out
some.
1. Philo says clearly and repeatedly that God lacks nothing. Plato's
Euthyphro would take it for granted that one cannot make the gods better
' J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London 1977) 150. Even a great expert (and author of
the entry "Plalon" in Pauly's RE) like Hans Leisegang remarks on rpv 5' euoePeiav Geou
BepaTteiav wTtap^o-ooav in our passage: "Die Philo vorschwebende Definition isl stoisch:
Sexlus Adv. Math. IX. 123." {Die Werke Philons von Alexandria in deulscher Uebersetzung,
ed. L. Cohn [Breslau 1919] IE 294 n. 1—in Leisegang's translation with notes of Quod
Delerius.) Sextus ibid, does have eoxi yap evocPeia Enio-rnjin 6ecov SepaTieiaq, and his
source may have been Stoic (see SVF HI 264, 272, 604, 608). Bui Philo's source is clearly
Plato.
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(e.g. 13c6-10); but he does initially accept that one can offer them oxpeXia
(13c4-5)—and, indeed, that there are things which the gods require from us
(14el-5), with the consequence that ooioxric; is e^iTiopudi te^vti (14el-5),
however grudgingly he admits that. It is only under more pressure from
Socrates that he realizes that the gods cannot obtain any dxpeXia from us
(15a5^).
2. Philo takes it for granted that evaepeia is 0eov» GepaTieia. This
definition (of E-i)oePe(; Kal oaiov—whereas oaiov and its cognates are
entirely absent from our passage of Philo), offered by Euthyphro at 12d5-8,
is the one refuted by Socrates from that point in Plato's dialogue until the
crisis of Mall.
3. In the course of that refutation, by Socrates, of Euthyphro's fi xcov
Gecbv 6£pa7i£{a, Euthyphro offers livTiep . . . ol SovXoi xot)(; bzanoxac,
Gepanevovaiv as an explanation of this particular Gepaneia. This is not so
much refuted as brushed aside by Socrates, who, almost with a sleight of
hand, concentrating on \j7iTipeTiKTi, moves on to another example. Philo
takes it for granted that zxxsi^eia is GepaTteia Qeov in this sense: oKoiav
5o\)A.oi 5ea7i6Tai<; x6 ke^e\)6)I£vov doKvcoc; tioveiv EyvcoKoteq
{)TCTlpET0V)OlV.
4. Philo's idea that those who serve God properly do so only for their
own improvement and benefit would be incomprehensible to the Euthyphro
of Plato's dialogue—and, on this point, Euthyphro would not be eccentric,
or different from the average Athenian or pagan in general.^
Yet, perhaps surprisingly at first sight, some of those points, made so
positively and decisively by Philo, are points which may well emerge (other
things, between Plato and Philo, being unequal) out of reading between the
lines of Plato's dialogue.^
The idea that the gods lack nothing and require nothing of us is, of
course, alien to Euthyphro's whole attitude to life. He is suing his father
because he is afraid of ^laa^a (4b7 ff.). For him, toc oaia (14al 1 ff.
—
forgetting yet again that Socrates had asked him at 5c-d for the one oaiov,
always xa-otov
. . . ev naar\ Tipd^Ei . . . avxb a-uToJ, and that, at 6dl0, he
had reminded him that he does not want xd noXka oaia, aXX' ekeivo a-uxo
x6 Ei8o<;) consist in the correct knowledge of acts which please the gods
and, therefore, save individuals and cities, while their opposites destroy
them. Yet even Euthyphro, under pressure from Socrates (and with the help
of the socially unpleasant EjinopiK-n xe/vti) asks at last: dXX' oI'ei, co
^ Bui Philo's point would have been perfeclly inlelligible to some Palestinian Sages.
Antigonus of Socho used to say: "Be not like the servants who serve the master in the
expectation of receiving a reward," etc. (Mishna Aboth 1. 3). This is not to say that Philo
knew this saying, or Hebrew
—
problems which should not concem us here—merely thai such
an idea was probably current in Jewish pious circles at the lime.
' In what follows, I shall draw heavily on a book in preparation on Plato's Euthyphro by Mr.
Ivor Ludlam and myself, and I hope to be more precise and detailed there.
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ItoKpateq, Touq 0EO\)(; axpeXeioGai anb xotjtcov a Tiap'
-njicov
Xa|ipdvo\)aiv; (15a4-6). In response to Socrates' further question he
explains that we only give them ti)j.t| Kal yipa.
Socrates' refutation, from now on, is based on the distinction, accepted
by Euthyphro, that any "gifts" we give to the gods are either cocpeJiip.a or
(pihx. Since cbcpeXijiov is out, (pi?iov remains. But we have already refuted
the definition of to oaiov as to Qzo<^ikiq, in various stages and senses
(6el0-l lb8). Thus, the dialogue ends in dcTiopia.
But hold. Have we really, from Euthyphro's outburst at 14all-b7,
been discussing to ooiov, or was it rather to evoepec;? Plato's Socrates is,
in some measure, responsible for this confusion^ At 5c8 he starts his request
for a definition with tioiov ti to e-uaePeq (pfiq eivai Kal to aoz^kc, Kal nepl
(povoD Kal nepl twv aXXcov;—and then passes, almost imperceptibly, to to
ooiov alone, whereas to e-uoePeq is not mentioned again until 12e. There,
the combined e-uoePeq te Kal ooiov is employed by Euthyphro in his
definition, but not before Socrates had asked, to tioiov |J.epoc, xo\> 6iKaio\)
oaiov eoTiv, iva
. . . ixtite aoePeiaq Ypa^peoOai. Euthyphro falls into the
trap, since he, unlike Socrates, makes no distinction between acts like
prosecuting a suspected murderer and sacrificing. For him, both are equally
done for the sake of divine reward and for eschewing divine punishment.
Plato, however, has no intention of confusing his perceptive reader (and
he writes for none else). Such a reader has noticed that even Euthyphro
(4b9) has conditioned oaiov in his particular case on eite ev 5ikti ekteivev
6 KTEivaq ei'te jiTi, thus paving the way, even at that early stage, to Socrates'
suggestion (lle4 ff.) that ooiov is part of 5iKaiov. This had been. brought
out by Socrates' argument (7b2 ff.) that if the gods quarrel among
themselves, it is about to te 5iKaiov Kal to a5iKov Kal Ka^v Kal aioxpov
Kal dyaGov Kal KaKov (7dl-2), a widespread contemporary expression for
what we, after Aristotle, would call ethical problems'*—but an expression
which contains to 6iKaiov. At 8b6 ff. Euthyphro is certain of the gods'
agreement that a murderer should be brought to justice, and Socrates
convinces him that all men agree as well. It is, I think, because of this close
connection between ooiov and 5iKaiov that Euthyphro agrees (lOel-2) oti
. . . TO . . . OOIOV 5id TOVTO cpi^EioGai [vnb tcov Gecov] oti ooiov eotiv—and
not the opposite. This would make no sense if applied to prayers, sacrifices
and £\)0£p£ia in general, whose whole existence would be meaningless
without the gods as recipients.
Yet from Mall to the end of the dialogue, the discussion had been
turned by Euthyphro (as Socrates hints at 14b8-c6) from acts of justice with
religious overtones to acts of pure worship—that is, from ooiov to etjoePec;.
This would imply that the final refutation, relying as it does on Euthyphro's
** On this and related issues, see my forthcoming article, "Ta ovo^ata xf\q r\QiKf\c, npb tov
'\p\axoxiXo\)c„" lo be published (with a brief English summary) in the Proceedings of the
Second International Congress of Greek Philosophy, Samos, August 1990.
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admission at lOel-2, is not valid if applied to acts of ritual like prayers and
sacrifices. Even here, one could claim that if such things are xoiq 0eoi<;
(pihx, the gods need them in some way and are somehow made ^eKxiovc, for
them. But if we take 14elO-15alO to imply that, since the gods give us all
the good things we have, they deserve honor and respect from us even
though they need, and get, nothing out of them, we would be getting near
enough to Philo's position—without, of course, Philo's transcendental one
God, and without Philo's idea, so central to his thought, that worshiping
God is a step in a man's progress towards his aim in life, knowledge of God.
Would all this imply that Philo had unravelled so much of the dramatic
and dialectic side of this aporetic dialogue? That, for example, he saw the
distinction between zxxsz^kc, and ogiov; understood that the final otTiopia
applied only to the latter and did not refute the former; that it was the former
which needed refuting in the last part of the discussion—or even the "small
detail," that the example of slaves serving their masters has not been really
refuted? I doubt it. Even a brief glimpse at Leisegang's indices will remind
us that, for Philo, EvoePeia and b(5\&iy\c, are one and the same virtue. From
examples which can be brought by the bushel I cite only one clear one. At
Spec. Legg. 4. 135 we have Ttepl |iev o\)v xfjq f|7e^ov{6o<; tcov dpExcov,
EvoEPeiaq Kttl ooioTnxoq. It is, I suspect, precisely because Philo makes no
distinction between EV)oePeia and ooioxrig, and because he does not read
the dialogue as drama—how many did in his age?—that he can take for
granted what Euthyphro admits only under pressure, that God cannot benefit
from anything we do; that he can accept (and extend in his own language)
Euthyphro's description of 0Epa7i£{a as the one given by slaves to
masters—indeed, that he can retain GEpaTtEia 0£ot) (for Plato's Gecov, of
course) as the definition of . . . but of what? Of EvoEPEia, what else? This
may not be very far from sentiments expressed by Plato's Socrates
elsewhere; see especially Phaedo 62bl-8. But once again, within Philo's
general framework of man's progress from worship of God to a different
life consisting of contemplating God, this acquires a new dimension.
Philo has prepared the ground. From 46 on, the argument has been that
the virtuous man, symbolized by Abel, cannot be killed in any sense by the
earthly "sophist" Cain—and was not killed even on a plain p-rirn EpjirivEia
(47). At 49 we are told that the wise man lives an incorruptible life by
dying to the corruptible life. That is, the wise man does himself good by
living the life of striving after God. The argument from koiov)v and Tidaxov
in 49 may already echo Euthyphro lOa-d, but 1 doubt it. There, only
ndaxov is mentioned at c3^. It is more likely to be of Aristotelian or Stoic
provenance.^ Certainly, the distinction between 6iEaTT|K6Ta and fivco^iEva
at 50 is Stoic.^ But once we have shown that the soul is one unit, where xo
^ See, e.g., SVF n 161 . 30 and context.
^ See the translators' note in the Loeb edition of Philo, II 494, on 49.
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Koiov)v and to Taxa/ov are one and the same, what better example than the
greatest of virtues, EV)ae{3£ia?
For some of Plato's dialogues we have ample ancient evidence:
quotations, references, verbal reminiscences and paraphrases, beginning
sometimes with Aristotle and Xenocrates and including papyri, Cicero,
Plutarch, Church Fathers and other authors. One need only look at the
"apparatus of citations" in the text of Dodds' great edition of Gorgias for
such a catalogue. Other dialogues are less fortunate. For Euthyphro our
only pieces of ancient evidence—apart from its inclusion in the lists of
Aristophanes and Thrasyllus—have so far been Plutarch, De Genio Socratis
10 (Moralia 580d), Diogenes Laertius 2. 29 and Numenius ap. Euseb. PE
13. 5 (fr. 30 Leemans = 23 des Places)."^ This scarcity of ancient evidence
was one of the grounds—when this was the fashion around the middle of
the last century—used by those who wished to athetize the dialogue.* Chief
among those athetizers was the—then young—Friedrich Ueberweg, who
took the scantiness of ancient testimony as his starting-point, and went on to
suggest, on "internal grounds," that Euthyphro was a forgery—an early one,
since it was already Platonic to Aristophanes—and to offer the obscure
Pasipho of Eretria as the likely culprit.^ The fact—I hope we have shown it
is a fact—that another ancient author, a contemporary of Thrasyllus and
earlier than Plutarch, Numenius and Diogenes, has also made use of this
dialogue, would make no difference to an alhetizer, if one is still around.
Philo does not mention Plato—he may have read it as someone else's work.
In any case, a Pasipho, a Simon the Shoemaker, or any other Socratic whose
name is known to us, would do for an early forger. But I still find it almost
aesthetically satisfying to discover another reader of this dialogue.
How does Philo make use of these pages of Euthyphro"! Not, I believe,
with Plato's (or Pasipho's) text before him. Not just because he docs not
follow, in his reminiscences, the order of Plato's text; he is under no
obligation to do so in what is not expressly a paraphrase. Nor is it because
"^ See M. Croisel (ed.). Platon, Oeuvres Completes I (Paris 1946) 179.
For a comprehensive bibliography (for its time) on this and other issues related to
Euthyphro, see E. Wagner, "UeberPlatons Eulhyphron, zur Frage seiner Echihcii und zu seiner
Erklaerung," in Festschrift Ludwig Friedlaender (Leipzig 1895) 438-55, esp. 438-39. On the
whole of that fashion of alhetizing dialogues and the methods and criteria employed, one of the
best summaries is still that of S. Ribbing, Genetlsche Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre
H: Untersuchungen ueber die Echtheit und die Reihenfolge platonischen Schriften (Leipzig
1864) 3-78. The book is a translation of the Swedish original of 1858, and therefore has no
account of Ueberweg (see next note). For what is still one of the clearest and best argued
rejections of this fashion, see G. Grote, Plato and the other Companions ofSokrates, 2nd ed.
(London 1867)1132-211.
^ F. Ueberweg, Untersuchungen ueber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge platonischen Schriften
(Vienna 1861) 250-51; sec also 201. I had the good fortune to read this book in London
University Library in George Grole's own copy, with his copious annotations in pencil. Very
often, Grote underlines, and then copies in the margin, the expression "innere Gruende." See
his sardonic remarks on this issue in his Plato (previous note) 189-90, 198, 206.
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he rewrites much of what is in Plato in his own words; Philo does that even
to Biblical passages he is expressly commenting on. The more pedestrian
and "external" clues are always better, and I think one exists here: Philo's
and Plato's dogs and their breeders. In Euthyphro 13al-clO Plato has only
icuveq and k-uvtiyetikt]. In our passage of Philo it is only ojcu^^aKeq and
aK\)XaKe-oxiKT|.'^ Now, oK'u^.a^ and aK-uA,dKiov and cognates exist in
Plato,' ^ but only six times, as against the far more frequent kxxhv and
cognates—and Plato knows only of KwriyexiKTi. Philo, according to
Mayer's index, has k-ucov sixteen times, K-uvT|y6(; and cognates seven times
(and never K-uvriYexiKTi), while he has oKv^a^ and cognates seven times
(and our oicuA^aKEDxiKTi). This is just what one would expect. In today's
Greek, <5K\)X\{pv) and oK-uXd)ci(ov) are the normal words for "dog"; only
the most persistent purist would use kucov. The "demotic" use of aioj^ia^
—
originally meaning "puppy" or "puppy dog"—to mean simply "dog" started
probably in Plato's time, or somewhat earlier. Like a few other "demotic"
words, it occasionally finds its way to Plato's texts. Philo has already a few
more instances of oK'u^.a^ as against ktScov, most probably since, in his
time, he was already using more regularly the more "demotic" form. Yet
K-utov is more frequent even in his works
—
probably whenever he
remembers that this is the "good Attic" word. Had Philo the Platonic text
before him, he would have used the more 56ki)j.ov Kal 'Atthcov word and
its cognates, since they were, in that case, in his lexl.'-^
What, then, did he have? The verbal reminiscences, sometimes almost
exact, suggest that he is not quoting from memory. The scarcity of ancient
testimonies to Euthyphro makes it unlikely that this dialogue was frequently
read and studied even by Platonists; after all, the same issues are dealt with
in a simple exposition, without the irritation of a dramatic and aporetic
dialogue, in Book 10 of the Laws. The same consideration would also
preclude a piece of a Middle Platonist handbook as Philo's source. If I may
be bold, I would like to suggest that what Philo had before him were notes
he had taken—with his own interpretations and conclusions—some time
before he wrote this work, of the last pages of Plato's Euthyphro. I do not
exactly remember now whether the suggestion that Philo may be using
notes de lecture from time to time when he seems to follow his sources has
been made, and I have not checked my von Amim, Bousset and Heinemann
for such a suggestion. That such notes were used by writers in late antiquity
is now commonly acknowledged. Scrolls were far too hard to roll and
unroll for every reference and reminiscence.
'° According lo our dictionaries a hapax eiremenon in the whole of Greek literature.
^' Rep. 2. 375a2, 7. 537a7, 539b6. 5. 451d7. Farm. 128cl.
'^ It is a pity that Phrynichus has no entry like icucov 56)anov • oKruXa^ dSoKijiov. The fact
that Plato has the "wrong" word—and in central dialogues like Republic and Parmenides—
may have deterred him.
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In a famous passage of a famous book, the greatest Philonian scholar of
the last generation wrote:
Nous considerons done que la recherche de paralleles philosophiques
grccs est pour I'historien de Philon une tache a coup sur exlremement
importante et, tant qu'elle est maintenue dans ses limites raisonnables, tout
a fait fructueuse. Mais les contradictions memes qui la divisent montrent
sans ambiguite que pour une quete de Philon elle ne saurait venir qu'en
deuxieme ligne, a la fa^on d'une discipline auxiliaire.^-^
Yet even the most dedicated Philonian scholar today would hardly
maintain that he or she can accept Philo's allegorical interpretation of
Scripture as proper exegesis.^"* Besides, not every reader of Philo reads him
sui ipsius causa, or merely so. Many of us read Philo—with all our
admiration for his personality and our sympathy for his dedication to a
righteous way of life—also as one of our main sources for the works and
opinions of Greek philosophers existing and available in his age—an age for
which our philosophical sources, at least the contemporary ones, are not
abundant. This is just the way in which most of us would read, say, many
of the Church Fathers, with all their importance as evidence for the spirit of
their age and their own community, also as sources of evidence for
Hellenistic-Roman philosophy—and for the Pre-Socratics.
All of us have learned many things from the numerous works published
by Miroslav Marcovich in the course of an astonishing career which is still
at its zenith. One thing he has taught us is that fragments and testimonia
have not been bom equal. Even what passes, or is passed, for a fragment
may be an exact quotation, a paraphrase, or what Marcovich has labelled
"Respicit": a close, or not so close, verbal reminiscence. In comparison
with work of this kind done by Marcovich himself, I would be happy if the
present note is considered as "Respicit."
Tel-Aviv University
'^ V. Nikiproweizky, Le commentaire de I'EcrUure chez Philon d'Alexandrie (Leiden 1977)
14.
'* See Leopold Cohn's words in his general inlroduclion to the great German translation
(above, note 1) 4: "Die Melhode seiner Ausgleichsbeslrebungen war verfehlt, aber die Reinheit
und l^ulerkeil seines Charakters leuchlet aus seinen Schriflcn hell hervor."
